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Abstract 
 
The increase in exports to market economies is a good sign, but it is not conclusive about 
the extent of restructuring of production technologies experienced in transition countries. 
This paper explores the source of the increase with an analysis of their exports’ quality, 
interprets the results for the extent of restructuring, and discusses the potential factors 
behind them. Changes in factor intensity and unit values of both CEEC and CIS exports 
in different manufacturing sectors during 1992-1999 are analyzed. Although CEEC are in 
a significantly better position than CIS due to Europe Agreements, there is still large 
number of products with structural problems in CEEC. Insufficient FDI, the OPT in the 
Europe Agreements, and not fully exploited human capital are suggested as possible 
factors.      
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature before the collapse of socialism provides numerous accounts for the 
technological backwardness in Eastern Europe: van Brabant (1988) and Bogomolov 
(1987) point out that Eastern European manufactured goods lacked sufficient quality and 
technical sophistication to be marketable in western markets. Treml (1981) identifies a 
similar situation in the Soviet manufactured goods and machinery. The US-imposed 
embargo on exports of strategic and high technology goods to communist economies in 
1947 can be counted as one of the important causes for this situation (van Brabant, 1980). 
However, the trade block formed in response among socialist countries in 1949, the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), where there were no incentives for 
competition or innovation, is considered by many as the primary reason for the low 
quality of Eastern European products.   
After the fall of socialism, these countries have undergone a series of reforms to 
restructure their production technologies. Most noteworthy reform towards this goal is 
the extensive efforts to liberalize their international trade. Beside the unilateral removal 
of quantitative trade barriers, almost immediately after the collapse of CMEA in 1991, 10 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) signed the Europe Agreements with the 
European Union (EU). Five out of 12 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
formed a customs union in 1994.
1  
Initially, the opinion in Europe was that this rapid trade liberalization would not 
succeed. They would not be able to export their products to market economies because 
their products were of such poor quality to be marketable internationally. Furthermore, 
their production technology was largely resource-intensive due to subsidized resource   4
imports from Russia, which made their capital obsolete after the breakup of CMEA. They 
needed to restructure their production technology.  
However, contrary to expectations, there has been a considerable reorientation of 
exports towards the EU, especially in CEEC, away from the former partners in CMEA. 
The increase in trade with market economies is a good sign, but it is not conclusive about 
the extent of restructuring experienced in transition countries. The important question is 
the source of the increase in trade with these non-traditional partners. The increase could 
be a result of intensive margin, where there is quality and thus price increase in the 
products, or extensive margin, where a larger quantity of a larger set of goods is exported 
(Hummels and Klenow, 2002). The answer to this question will help determine the extent 
of restructuring achieved, and thus the success of transitional reforms.  
At this point, a distinction should be made between restructuring and specialization. 
Within the context of transition countries, restructuring implies improving product 
quality by upgrading the production technologies. Specialization implies changes in the 
quantity of exports in response to liberalization. As trade barriers are removed, the 
composition of exports changes to reflect the comparative advantages. Depending on the 
relative factor endowments, this leads to specialization in certain industries. Even if a 
country specializes in low-skilled labor or resource intensive industries, it could still 
experience restructuring. This can be done by gradually improving the production 
technology and thus the quality of the products in that industry.  
Previous work on this area concentrated primarily on the most advanced countries in 
CEEC, and covered the time period of 1989-94. In the earliest analysis, Drabek and 
Smith (1995) found that the unit values of EU imports from CEEC have fallen.   5
Analyzing 1989-92, Brenton and Gros (1997) found little evidence for product 
upgrading. Although Landesmann and Burgstaller (1998) argued that CEEC exports are 
concentrated on lower quality products, they indicated that the quality gap between the 
EU, and Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic narrowed during 1989-94, 
and the gap with Bulgaria and Romania widened.  
This paper analyses the changes in the quality of exports from all 22 transition 
countries, interprets the findings to determine the extent of restructuring, and discusses 
the potential factors behind it. The focus is on only the manufacturing exports (SITC 5-8) 
at product level during 1992-99, which excludes early years of transition with turbulent 
macroeconomic problems.
2 The analysis is restricted to exports to market economies 
only. The reasons are numerous: Most importantly, restructuring of production 
technologies is needed to be able to export especially to market economies. Exports to 
formerly socialist partners could still be under the influence of CMEA arrangements in 
practice, despite its formal abolishment. Lastly, developed or developing, market 
economies are becoming increasingly important partners for transition countries.
3 
Although this analysis should not be considered as a formal empirical test of 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), the approach of this paper is influenced by their quality 
ladders concept in economic growth. Accordingly, the middle income South competes 
with the industrialized North by imitating their innovations. In the South, progress is 
achieved by importing product designs and production methods of the North. If the factor 
endowment conditions permit, the South can earn rents due to lower manufacturing costs. 
In the wake of loss of profit potential, the North designs the next generation higher 
quality product and methods. Eventually, this product is imitated in the South, too.   6
Overall, a gradual increase in quality is observed for the products manufactured in the 
South. Transition countries very nicely represent the South in this theory: High levels of 
FDI provide a channel for importing product designs and methods; Abundance of human 
capital, and its low cost make imitation feasible and profitable, respectively.         
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, changes in factor intensity 
of exports are analyzed to get an idea about changes in the quality of their products. 
CEEC and CIS countries are analyzed separately for comparison. Section 3 briefly 
discusses the limitations of analyzing factor intensity of exports in this context, and some 
issues related to the use of unit values to represent quality. In this section, changes in 
quality and their implications on economic restructuring are discussed in detail. Then, 
changes in aggregate unit values, number of products under quality improvement are 
analyzed. Lastly, based on changes observed in unit values and trade balance, products 
are categorized into those with structural problems, with deficit in price competition, as 
well as those under successful price or quality competition. Section 4 interprets of the 
results by relating them to the scope of trade liberalization agreements, the FDI inflows, 
and the abundance and the cost of factor endowments such as human capital. 
  
2.  FACTOR INTENSITY OF EXPORTS 
 
A traditional way to find out about the quality of goods is to look at the production 
technology. Changes in the factor content of production reveal the amount of 
technological improvement and thus the extent of restructuring. Under CMEA, the factor 
used intensively in transition countries’ exports was resource. Thus, a move towards 
human and physical capital intensive production implies significant improvement of the   7
production technology. To analyze the factor content of the transition countries’ exports 
to market economies, this paper uses the quality classification of Wolfmayr-Schnitzer 
(1998). Accordingly, the quality of production increases with the intensity of factors in 
the following order: Resource intensive, human capital intensive- low technology, labor 
intensive, human capital intensive-medium technology-labor intensive, human capital 
intensive-medium technology-capital intensive, human capital intensive-high technology- 
labor intensive, and human capital intensive-high technology-capital intensive. SITC 
codes of products in each factor content category are given in Appendix 1. 
Figures 1 and 2 give shares of these factor content categories in exports of CEEC and 
CIS to market economies each year during the period of 1992-99. There are clear 
differences between the factor content of CEEC and CIS exports. In CEEC, the share of 
resource intensive exports is much smaller, and it has a downward trend. This downward 
trend started late in 1995 in Bulgaria and Romania. In contrast, the share of resource 
intensive products in CIS exports was very large, ranging from 53% in Moldova to 97% 
in Tajikistan in 1992, except Armenia (16%). Seven CIS countries experienced a 
decrease in the share of resource intensive exports. The decreasing trend was reversed in 
Kyrgyzstan in 1996 and in Tajikistan in 1999, coinciding with their inclusion in the CIS 
customs union. There was no decreasing trend in other members of CIS customs union, 
such as the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.  
The trend in the share of top 4 high quality categories exhibit differences between 
CEEC and CIS as well. All CEEC, except for relatively labor abundant countries 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania) experienced substantial increases in the share 
of these four high quality categories. These four countries experienced increases in the   8
share of labor intensive exports in these four countries, as a result of Outward Processing 
Trade (OPT) arrangements in the Europe Agreements for labor intensive sectors of 
clothing and footwear (SITC 841, 842, 851).
4 Shares of top 4 high quality categories 
ranged from 9% to 17% in these four countries in 1999. It was 29% in Poland, 51% in 
Hungary, and between 39% and 46% in other CEEC. In the CIS, a decreasing trend in the 
share of these categories was more common, except in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, 
and Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, their share was much smaller than those for CEEC.   
 
3. IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN THE UNIT VALUE OF EXPORTS 
 
Although examining the factor intensity of manufacturing exports gives a general 
idea about the extent of restructuring, not much can be inferred about the response of 
individual sectors to competition from market economies due to the amount of 
aggregation involved. Furthermore, the analysis in the previous section is based on shares 
of export volumes of products. The observed changes could very well be a result of an 
increase in quantity, that is, specialization in certain industries according to comparative 
advantages, as well as restructuring of production technologies, measured by increases in 
quality. To get a better idea about restructuring, changes in quality must be measured for 
individual products, rather than an analysis of shares of export volumes. Unit values 
provide a better and more frequently used tool to measure quality changes due to 
technological improvements.  
The unit value of exports is defined as the dollar value of exports in a given 
commodity category divided by its physical weight. Units can be weight in tons, volume 
in cubic meters, area in square meters, or even length in meters. Thus, the unit value   9
might be different from unit price. Thanks to the work of Lipsey (1963), and Kravis and 
Lipsey (1971, 1974), it has been known that unit value indices can be poor substitutes for 
price indexes. Several reasons have been put forward to explain this inadequacy of unit 
values: First of all, changes in unit values might be a result of not only price changes but 
also the change in quality of products. According to Enoch (1978), Maciejewski (1983), 
and King (1993), the most commonly cited reason is that a change observed in unit 
values may not necessarily be a result of an underlying price change, but simply a 
reflection of changes in the composition of goods within a class of products: The unit 
value for a class of products will change if the quantity of a low price product in that 
class changes relative to the quantity of high price products or vice versa. Furthermore, in 
different countries unit values are combined with different weights, and different index-
number formulae are used. However, the unit values can still reflect the price if the 
quantity unit in which output is measured is the same as the unit of the input, and material 
is the most important input. For example, since iron is the primary material used in steel, 
the unit value of steel reflects its price.  
According to Aiginger (1998), Landesmann and Burgstaller (1998), rather than the 
price, a higher unit value reflects higher quality. The reasoning is two-fold: If the 
products are similar, the prices that consumers are willing to pay must lie in differences 
in the consumers’ perception of the quality of the products. Furthermore, higher quality 
products embody a greater proportion of factors that do not make a corresponding 
contribution to the weight of the product. This argument coincides with the previous 
analysis where products that intensively use human and physical capital are assumed to 
have higher quality. When there are different products in the same category, unit values   10
reflect differences in the value added. Differences in the value added reflect the quality 
differences, arising from better skills or technology. For example, differences in the unit 
value of watches are signs of quality differences. 
Aiginger (1998) argues that as a country’s output structure moves up the quality 
ladder, this is reflected in an increase in the unit value of that country’s aggregate exports 
of manufactures. A country with higher unit values supplies a higher quality of the same 
product or different products from a higher priced segment. Consequently, differences in 
the unit value of aggregate exports can be taken as an approximation of the relative 
quality difference. Aggregation, which seems to be a disadvantage in comparison of pure 
prices, proves to be an advantage in comparing the quality of exports at different points in 
time or across countries.  
When competing internationally, the technologically superior partner retains its 
competitiveness with increasing quality, and the inferior one becomes more competitive 
by engaging in price competition. Thus, transition countries can engage in either price 
competition and sell their existing products at lower prices without restructuring their 
production technologies, or try to improve the quality of their products by restructuring. 
The difference is that technological restructuring cannot happen instantaneously, but 
price competition can.
5 Given the initial conditions, transition countries are expected to 
initially engage in more price competition than quality improvement. They can overcome 
this initial disadvantage through changes in the economic environment away from 
innovation-averse culture towards one that encourages innovation and by importing 
product designs and production methods, and move up the quality ladder as suggested in 
Grossman and Helpman (1991). Thus, lower quality products gradually disappear to the   11
extent of restructuring. This discussion implies U-shaped aggregate unit values: In the 
early periods of transition, countries engage in price competition, and the unit values 
decrease. As time passes, there are increases in the quality of some products and/or the 
proportion of products with higher quality increases due to restructuring. Consequently, 
the aggregate unit value starts increasing after some point. Of course, given a time period 
of analysis, depending on where each country is in restructuring, one may observe 
decreasing aggregate unit values if restructuring has not been significant so far, or 
increasing aggregate unit values if quality improvement due to restructuring has been 
more dominant than price competition.  
This is what is observed in Figure 3, where aggregate unit values for each sector (1-
digit SITC categories) are plotted for each transition country. In the chemicals sector, 
price competition is widespread in CEEC, whereas except for two countries, CIS 
experienced increases in unit values. Quality improvement is common in other sectors for 
CEEC: In the manufacturing sector, all CEEC experienced increases in the unit values. In 
the machinery and miscellaneous manufacturing sectors, the unit values increased for the 
majority of CEEC. Hungary experienced decreases in both sectors. Slovenia experienced 
a decrease in only miscellaneous manufacturing. In the machinery sector, Slovenia and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics eventually turned the decreasing trend up. Decreasing 
unit values are much more common in CIS. The U-shaped unit values are especially 
common in the machinery sector. The manufacturing sector is the sector where the 
majority of the CIS countries experienced increasing unit values.    
Apart from aggregate unit values, an analysis of the unit values in each product 
category (4-digit level SITC categories) is also necessary: Table 1 gives the number   12
traded products under quality improvement to get an idea about the extent of 
restructuring in each transition country in each of SITC 5-8 sectors.
6 If there is an 
increasing trend in the unit value for a product category for the whole time period, it is 
considered to be already under quality improvement in 1993. Each year, the products that 
reverse the decreasing trend to an increasing trend are added to the list of products under 
quality improvement. The difference between CIS and CEEC is once again striking. For 
all CEEC, more than 30% of traded products were under quality improvement in 1993, 
and almost all CEEC surpassed 40% by the end of 1999, led by the Czech Republic, and 
Poland. Although started at low levels, Slovenia, and Hungary had the fastest increase in 
the number of products under quality improvement.
7 Baltic States of Lithuania, Estonia 
and Latvia started at the lowest level, and had the lowest rate of increase. In contrast to 
CEEC, in all CIS except European CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) and 
Kazakhstan, the percentage of traded products under quality improvement remained 
below 15% for the all period of analysis. In the first three countries, the rate of increase 
was comparable to that in CEEC. Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Moldova had smaller 
increases. The increase in other CIS can be considered negligible. When all CIS and 
CEEC are considered together to observe differences across sectors, it can be seen that 
the machinery sector (SITC-7) performed the worst in CIS, but the best in CEEC. The 
chemicals sector (SITC-5) did not perform well in both groups of countries. Especially in 
CEEC, this sector’s performance was significantly different than other sectors.       
While increasing unit values is an indicator of quality competitiveness for some 
industries, for others, decreasing unit value can be an indicator of price competitiveness. 
Put differently, although decreasing unit values does not imply restructuring, it is not   13
always a sign of distressed trade from structural problems. To decide if there are 
structural problems that need to be addressed, the performance of trade balance should be 
considered: Deteriorating trade balance can imply structural problems, or deficit in price 
competition depending on the direction of change in unit values. In a static analysis, 
Aiginger (1997) partitions products into four categories: Accordingly, if products are 
homogenous, price competition is important and unit values reflect average costs. In this 
case, the country with lower costs will be net exporter. This is the case of successful price 
competition. In contrast, trade deficit together with lower unit values implies distressed 
trade resulting from structural problems. If product innovation is important, the unit 
values will be higher than the costs, and will reflect technological superiority. If a country 
is a net exporter, despite higher unit values, this must be due to successful quality 
competition. Finally, a deficit in price competition occurs, when a country has higher unit 
value and suffers from a trade deficit. In this case, the country has lost its price 
competitiveness due to high production costs.  
In the absence of unit values of exports from partners for comparison, extending this 
static analysis across time allows similar categories: When trade balance is improving, 
increasing unit values is a sign of quality competition, whereas decreasing unit values is a 
sign for price competition. Consequently, when trade balance deteriorates, decreasing 
unit values implies structural problems, and the country loses its price competitiveness if 
unit values increase.     
Table 2 gives the number of traded products that fall under the competitiveness 
categories described above for each CEEC and CIS.
8 The picture is gloomy for both 
CEEC and CIS, but much better for CEEC. In 1999, at least a quarter of products still had   14
structural problems in all CEEC, smallest in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Poland and Hungary. The situation is the same for Russia, and Ukraine, but much worse 
in other CIS ranging from 54% in Belarus to 96% in Turkmenistan. The percentage of 
products where CEEC is losing its price competitiveness is also rather high, from 25% in 
Latvia to about 40% in Poland. A fewer proportion of products is in this category in CIS. 
Products that transition countries are competitive by either price or quality are much 
higher in CEEC than in CIS. The proportion ranges from 20% to 40%, where the 
majority is under quality competition for almost all CEEC. All CIS, except for Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus, are competitive in less than 15% of the products. Competitiveness 
in these three countries is more or less comparable to CEEC. When analyzed sector by 
sector, it can be seen that manufacturing sectors SITC 6 and 8 are the most competitive 
sectors for both CEEC and CIS, and the chemicals sector (SITC-5) is the least 
competitive sector. Largest proportion of structural problems was in the chemicals sector. 
        
4. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
Overall, CEEC countries performed much better than the CIS countries by the end of 
1999. Considering the period of analysis, these results are partly consequences of the 
liberalization agreements. Table 3 gives the years of substantial unilateral removal of 
quantitative barriers, and the partner and dates of major liberalization agreements signed 
by transition countries. The Europe Agreements forced CEEC to compete with market 
economies, where CEEC had to restructure the production technology to be able to 
export. On the other hand, the CIS customs union was an attempt to preserve the status 
quo under CMEA. It does not encourage restructuring since it does not encourage trade   15
with market economies. The increase in trade of resource-intensive goods in CIS customs 
union countries is a direct result of this. The effects of partner and date of liberalization 
are reflected into the correlation coefficients with the percent of products under structural 
problems. The coefficient is significant and negative for a dummy for CEEC (-0.7), 
implying that CEEC have significantly lower structural problems. It is insignificant and 
positive for a dummy for the CIS customs union members (0.19). Furthermore, the 
calculations show that the earlier the liberalization starts, the lower the percentage of 
products with structural problems. The coefficients are 0.74 and 0.73, with dates of 
removal of quantitative barriers, and dates of liberalization agreements, respectively.     
CEEC’s success is also explained by the theory of Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
Accordingly, in order to improve the production technology, a country should first import 
the product designs and production methods, imitate them, and have lower costs of 
production to profitably export it. FDI is certainly one channel for obtaining design and 
methods, and transition countries certainly have the human capital to imitate, and low 
costs to make a profit. The amounts of cumulative FDI during 1988-99 are given in Table 
3, as well as three different measures of human capital, and monthly wages at the 
beginning of the period of analysis. CEEC countries have received the largest FDI among 
all emerging markets, have lower costs of labor and levels of human capital that are 
comparable to developed market economies, if not higher. Furthermore, Prosi (1998) 
argues that technology transferred by FDIs meet the factor proportions and technological 
skills of more advanced economies, not those of labor intensive economies. These factors 
combined together caused them to perform much better than the CIS as can be seen from 
correlation coefficients
9. The coefficient between the percent of products with structural   16
problems, and the amount of cumulative FDI is significant and negative (-0.53). The 
coefficient with measures of human capital are all negative, but only significant for the 
education index (-0.46). Contrary to expectations, the coefficient with wages is 
significant, and negative. This is probably due to the fact that in all transition countries 
analyzed the wage rate is only a fraction of rates in developed market economies. As long 
as there is a wide wage gap, the restructuring will be more significant in countries that 
have higher FDI, and human capital.        
However, despite their success relative to CIS, CEEC have also underperformed. 
There is still a lot of restructuring needed in CEEC, ranging from 26% to 56% of the 
products. Simple tariff cuts by the Europe Agreements are apparently insufficient to 
stimulate massive structural changes. Given their factor abundance relative to the EU, the 
Europe Agreements forced some CEEC to specialize in labor intensive low quality 
products. Although Martin (1998) considers this potential for Maquiladora Syndrome 
unlikely for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, substantial increases in exports of 
labor-intensive products from Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania found in this 
paper should be noted with caution. In this context, it can be said that largely reported 
high skill in some CEEC is either overestimated or not yet exploited. Rosati (1998) 
proposes lack of capital as the leading cause. FDI was high, but considering how obsolete 
their capital was right after the fall of socialism, it is apparently not high enough.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There has been considerable amount of increase in the exports of transition countries 
to market economies, especially for the CEEC. This paper analyzed the quality of their   17
exports to see if product upgrading was the reason for the increase in trade, and to what 
extent this reorientation was a consequence of restructuring of production technologies. 
For this purpose, the manufacturing exports of 22 transition countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Central Asia to 28 developed or developing market economies 
during 1992-1999 were examined.  
The changes in quality are first analyzed with an examination of the factor intensity 
of exports. It is observed that the share of exports of resource-intensive products have 
been decreasing in both CEEC and CIS. However, this legacy of socialism is still quite 
significant in CIS countries, where the share is very high. Interestingly, the only CIS 
countries with increasing shares are the members of the CIS customs union. The share of 
human capital intensive products is high and increasing for CEEC, whereas it is 
decreasing for CIS. The only exceptions in the CEEC are Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and 
Lithuania, where the share of labor intensive products is increasing.      
Although these observations are interesting, they could be a consequence of 
increasing quantity due specialization according to comparative advantages. Therefore, 
an analysis of unit values is carried out. A U-shaped pattern in aggregate unit values is 
observed, which is a result of initial price competition followed by quality improvement. 
When products are analyzed individually, it is found that 40% of exports of most CEEC 
countries were under quality improvement. Baltic States and European CIS countries of 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus performed relatively worse. At most 15% of other CIS 
countries’ exports were under product improvement by 1999.  
Although decreasing unit values does not imply restructuring of production 
technologies, it could be a result of successful price competition, and not distressed sale   18
due to structural problems. To differentiate between these two possibilities, a dynamic 
version of the approach in Aiginger (1997) is applied. A gloomy picture resulted for both 
CEEC and CIS. Although the situation in CEEC was significantly better than CIS, more 
than 25% of products still had structural problems by the end of 1999. Russia and 
Ukraine performed comparable to CEEC. In other CIS, the percentage of products with 
structural problems ranged from 50% to 95%. Overall CEEC was much more competitive 
in either price or quality than the CIS countries.  
These observations are in conjunction with the quality ladders in economic growth 
theory of Grossman and Helpman (1991). To restructure the production technology, a 
country should import the product designs and methods. High levels of FDI in the CEEC 
provided a channel. The country should be able to imitate the products. Human capital 
levels in CEEC, comparable to developed economies, made this possible. Finally, there 
should be lower costs of production. Significantly lower wages in all transition countries 
made this whole process profitable. The correlation coefficients between the percent of 
products under structural problems, and these factors showed support for this theory.    19
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      TABLE 1. Products under quality improvement 
        The first two figures are the number of products under quality improvement in 1993 and 1999,       
        respectively. Numbers in parentheses are total numbers of products traded in a given sector.           
        Data source: International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country   Chemicals   Manufacturing  Machinery      Misc. Man.              Total  
BG  38-60   (98)    77-120 (182)    60-91   (142)  46-64   (98)      221-335 (520) 
CZ   34-57 (110)    88-130 (209)  113-149 (186)  61-87 (118)     296-423 (623) 
EE  10-18   (80)    68-86   (162)    54-67   (131)  44-52   (99)     176-223 (472) 
HU  30-58 (107)    83-128 (206)    67-103 (168)  38-67 (113)     218-356 (594) 
LV  13-24   (79)    55-67   (155)    33-43   (115)  37-49   (94)     138-183 (443) 
LT  15-21   (68)    67-87   (170)    39-55   (124)  45-56 (100)     166-219 (462) 
PL  29-52 (114)  100-145 (205)    92-135 (187)  43-66 (104)     264-398 (610) 
RO  26-40   (90)    84-121 (190)    77-107 (152)  53-76 (111)     240-344 (543) 
SK  36-46 (101)    79-124 (189)    76-109 (158)  49-72 (106)     240-351 (554) 
SI  26-51 (102)    81-127 (205)    70-106 (167)  34-60 (114)     211-344 (588) 
AM    0-0     (52)      4-4       (86)      0-1     (114)    3-3     (76)         7-8     (328) 
AZ    3-6     (82)      6-12   (143)      4-6     (138)    2-2     (90)       15-26   (453)  
BY  15-27   (88)    42-60   (159)    31-48   (117)  39-47   (92)     127-182 (456) 
GE    6-9     (59)    16-25   (122)      5-9     (104)    4-4     (82)       31-47   (367) 
KZ    8-18   (88)    29-42   (168)      7-15   (122)    7-7   (100)       51-82   (478) 
KG    1-3     (72)    14-18   (128)      3-5     (132)    0-2     (90)       18-28   (422) 
MD    4-6     (74)    12-16   (144)      3-5     (139)  19-23 (106)       38-50   (463)  
RU  44-67 (101)    85-126 (188)    70-108 (156)  42-70 (100)     241-371 (545) 
TJ    0-2     (48)      3-6       (72)      0-0     (104)    1-1     (69)         4-9     (293) 
TM    3-3     (89)      2-3     (141)      0-0     (141)    1-1     (84)         6-7     (455) 
UA  24-42   (89)    64-86   (168)    46-67   (110)  38-57   (93)     172-252 (460) 
  UZ    3-5     (77)    11-12   (151)      0-0     (142)    5-6   (100)       19-23   (470)   23
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       TABLE 2. Export competitiveness 
         Data source: International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Quality      Price     Deficit P.  Structural  
Country     Comp.      Comp.   Comp.       Problems   Total
BG    123        81         166              150       520
CZ       152     104          202              165       623 
EE      64       54          137              217       472 
HU      83     106          202              203       594 
LV      59       34          104              246       443 
LT      75       33          120              234       462  
PL      84       65          251              210       610 
RO     127       84          168              164       543 
SK     122      72          175              185       554 
SI       91       79          184              234       588 
AM         7         7              1              313      328 
AZ         7         9            17              420      453 
BY       79       48            83              246       456 
GE       20         8            26              313      367 
KZ       34       24            42              378        478 
KG       12       17            16              377      422 
MD       25       25            21              392      463 
RU     133       88          185              139       545 
TJ         4      7              2              280       293 
TM         3       10              4              438     455 
UA       86       64          137              173       460 
  UZ                   13         6              8              443       470   24
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APPENDIX 1. 
SITC-3 codes of products in each factor content categories 
Resource intensive:  
511, 512, 513, 514, 562, 611, 613, 634, 635, 641, 652, 653, 654, 659, 661, 662, 663, 664, 
665, 666, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 693, 
694 
Human capital intensive-low technology:  
553, 554, 592, 593, 711, 712, 713, 716, 742, 743, 762, 773, 793, 898 
Labor intensive:  
612, 621, 625, 629, 633, 642, 651, 655, 656, 657, 658, 667, 692, 696, 697, 699, 721, 722, 
724, 771, 784, 785, 786, 791, 812, 813, 821, 831, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 848, 851, 
885, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 897, 898, 899 
Human capital intensive-medium technology-labor intensive:  
689, 691, 695, 723, 725, 726, 727, 728, 731, 733, 735, 737, 741, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 
749, 751, 759, 761, 763, 764, 772, 774, 775, 811, 872, 873, 881, 884 
Human capital intensive-medium technology-capital intensive:  
515, 522, 523, 524, 531, 532, 533, 551, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 579, 581, 582, 583, 597, 
598, 679, 781, 782, 783, 882 
Human capital intensive-high technology-labor intensive:  
714, 718, 776, 778, 792, 871, 874 
Human capital intensive-high technology-capital intensive:  
516, 525, 541, 542, 591, 752     
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1 Interim Agreements on trade with the EU became effective by 1991, in Hungary (HU), 
and Poland (PL), 1993 with Bulgaria (BG), the Czech Republic (CZ), Romania (RO), and 
the Slovak Republic (SK), and by the end of 1996 in Slovenia (SI), Estonia (EE), Latvia 
(LV), and Lithuania (LT). The Russian Federation (RU), Kazakhstan (KZ), Belarus (BY) 
formed the CIS customs union in 1995. Kyrgyzstan (KG) and Tajikistan (TJ) joined in by 
the end of 1995, and 1999, respectively. Other CIS countries, Armenia (AM), Azerbaijan 
(AZ), Georgia (GE), Moldova (MD), Turkmenistan (TM), Ukraine (UA), and Uzbekistan 
(UZ) did not participate in the customs union.    
2 These constitute the most important developed and developing partners with market 
economies: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US. Exports to these countries constitute 97.3% of 
transition exports to all market economies in the world.  
3 Share of market economies in transition countries’ manufacturing exports varies 
between 76 to 90%. 
4 In a relevant earlier research, Neven (1995) finds that CEEC exports to the EU were 
concentrated on products that were intensive in relatively unskilled labor during 1985-
1990. 
5 Using a similar idea, Sheets and Boata (1998) take the extent of reorientation of trade 
from CMEA to the EU as a sign of restructuring: To the extent that industrial 
restructuring has taken place, the decline in CMEA exports should be related to 
expansion of exports to the EU with a lag, time needed to restructure. Price competition   30
                                                                                                                                                 
implies that decline in CMEA exports and increase in EU exports should be roughly 
contemporaneous.  
6 Products categories that transition countries were importing but unable to export are 
included in the group of traded products. 
7 The initial low proportion of products under quality improvement in relatively richer 
Slovenia and Hungary is most likely due to the fact that most products in these two 
countries were already of high quality, and not much further improvement was needed.  
8 Products categories that transition countries were importing but unable to export are 
assumed to have structural problems.  
9 In a relevant research, Stephan (2003) found the level of productivity in most advanced 
6 CEEC to increase from 22-55% of the EU average in 1993 to 46-76% in 2000.  
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